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COMMONWEALTH v. SHAFER: LIABILITY FOR
EMBEZZLEMENT OF SALES TAX FUNDS BY
VENDORS AS "TAX COLLECTORS"
A new form of criminal liability was adopted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Shafer' as to retail vendors under the
Pennsylvania Sales Tax Act.2 Reversing a unanimous decision below,3 the
court held that vendors who misapply sales tax funds accumulated in the
course of their business may be prosecuted under section 823 of the general
Penal Code, 4 entitled "Embezzlement by Tax Collectors," despite specific
penal provisions already within the Sales Tax Act. Section 823 had pre-
viously been invoked exclusively against public officials ;5 however, in Shafer6
the section was applied to retail vendors. It is the purpose of this Note to
analyze Shafer's interpretation of section 823 in view of the statutory rules
of construction applicable to criminal cases and the ambiguous nature of the
vendor's relationship to the state. Also, Pennsylvania's sales tax legislation
and case law will be compared with other states.
Marcus Shafer, president of a corporation engaged in the retail selling
of rugs and carpets was indicted for non-payment and mis-application of more
than 30,000 dollars allegedly collected by his firm as sales taxes over a period
of seven months. A motion to quash the indictment was granted and affirmed
by the superior court only to be reversed by the supreme court.
The supreme court in finding a section 823 indictment,7 completely
1. 414 Pa. 613, 202 A.2d 308 (1964).
2. Sales and Use Tax Act, Act of March 6, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1228, amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3403-1 to -605 (Supp. 1963). The act was amended subsequent
to the litigation of the instant case. Except as specifically noted, the act remains essen-
tially the same.
3. Commonwealth v. Shafer, 202 Pa. Super. 179, 195 A.2d 825 (1963), rev'd, 414
Pa. 613, 202 A.2d 308 (1964).
4. Penal Code § 823, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4823 (1963), provides:
Whoever, being charged with the collection, safekeeping, or transfer of any
taxes of the Commonwealth . . . converts or appropriates the moneys so col-
lected, or any part thereof, to his own use in any way whatever, or uses by way
of investment in any kind of property or merchandise any portion of the money
so collected by him as taxes, and proves a defaulter or fails to pay over the
same . . . is guilty of embezzlement, a felony . ...
5. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 74 Pa. D. & C. 313 (C.P. 1951). It was cited
by the superior court below and quoted with approval as follows:
In passing, it is well to observe that section 823 of the Penal Code of 1939 and
its predecessor, the Act of June 3, 1885, P.L. 72 . . . have consistently been
applied to collectors who are officials, elected or appointed, "duly qualified" as
"public officers" having a "term of office" where their "official capacity" is to
collect taxes.
202 Pa. Super. at 182, 195 A.2d at 827.
6. Justice Eagen dissented without opinion.
7. Similar indictments have produced conflicting results, and provide no clear
precedent for section 823's application to sales tax cases. Commonwealth v. Grace, 52
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ignored the section's title heading of "Embezzlement by Tax Collectors,"
choosing not to make any distinction within the class of tax collectors, i.e.,
between official and nonofficial tax collectors. While section headings may be
used in statutory construction, 8 they are not controlling9 and may be dis-
regarded where in conflict with the clear intent of the legislature as determined
by the "plain words" of the statute.10 Relying on these rules of construction,
the court noted that the text of section 823 does not contain the term "tax
collector," and furthermore, imposes embezzlement liability upon a class
described as "whoever, being charged with the collection, safe-keeping, or
transfer of any taxes of the Commonwealth . . ."I" reasoning that "whoever"
as defined in section 103 of the Penal Code 12 means "any person," without
qualification by the heading. Thus, the court concluded that it is "clear'
beyond question that vendors under the Sales Tax Act, are 'charged with the
collection, safekeeping, or transfer' of the sales tax.'
3
Further justification for the court's conclusion was drawn from the rela-
tionship between sections 823 and 82214 of the Penal Code. The latter
section, by providing for the punishment of an "officer, employee or agent"
of the Commonwealth who converts "public money" entrusted to him, makes
specific reference to public officials, while section 823 omits any such ref-
erence. Thus, the court concluded that by negative implication section 823
was not intended to be limited to public officials.' 5
Finally, the court determined that resort to the general Penal Code in
sales tax prosecutions is not precluded by the special penal provisions in
the Sales Tax Act. The court concluded that these special penal provisions
were not controlling in view of the act's saving clause which states that
nothing in the act shall be deemed to repeal, modify, suspend or render
inoperative any provision of the general laws, and that criminal offenses and
penalties specified should be in addition to the application of the general laws
arising from any transaction.'
Whether the court properly disregarded section 823's title heading,
Luz.L.J. 286 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (Section 823 held inapplicable to vendors under the Sales
Tax Act). Contra, Commonwealth v. Arnold, 76 York 110 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
8. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 554 (1952).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 554 (1952). The statute also states that provisos of
titles and preambles shall be considered to limit rather than extend the operation of
clauses to which they refer, but the statute distinguishes these from headings.
10. See In re American Surety Co. of New York, 319 Pa. 549, 181 Atl. 364 (1939).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4823 (1963).
12. Penal Code § 103, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4103 (1963).
13. 414 Pa. at 615, 202 A.2d at 310.
14. Penal Code § 822, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4822 (1963).
15. Yet the court disregarded the further distinction that section 822 refers to
"public money" while section 823 refers to "taxes" specifically.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-601(b) (Supp. 1963).
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"Embezzlement by Tax Collectors," depends on the true relationship between
the vendor and the Commonwealth with respect to sales tax administration.
More specifically, if the vendor's responsibilities under the Sales Tax Act
are fundamentally different from or paramount to those of a tax collector,
i.e., if the vendor is more analogous to a taxpayer, then application of this
section to a retail merchant would be incongruous.
A "taxpayer" has been defined as "a person chargeable with a tax; one
from whom government demands a pecuniary contribution towards its
support.' 7 Significantly, the Pennsylvania Sales Tax Act defines "taxpayer"
as "any person required to pay or collect the tax imposed by this act."' 8
The act further directs that "any person liable to collect tax from another
person . . . shall file reports, keep records, make payments, and be subject
to interest and penalties . .. as if he were directly subject to the tax."19
Similarly, the Maryland statute considers persons that are required to "make
returns" and "pay over" the tax collected to be "taxpayers. '20 The various
sales tax acts, however, do not define "tax collector" even though an obliga-
tion or authority to collect may be imposed. While the functions of a taxpayer
and a tax collector are nowhere described as mutually exclusive, statutory em-
phasis on liability of vendors as taxpayers magnifies the questionability of
finding collateral liability under a separate "Embezzlement by Tax Collectors"
section of the Penal Code.
Courts have supplemented the definition of "taxpayer" by declaring the
following to be "taxpayers": persons required to pay a tax to a collector
on the transportation of property, even though first required to collect it from
another taxpayer ;21 and persons collecting social security taxes. 22 Even
gasoline distributors considered agents for purposes of collecting and re-
mitting a motor fuels tax were held by an Oklahoma court to be taxpayers. 23
In so holding, the court stated:
The entire statutory arrangement . . . places the . . . [distributor]
in the position of the taxpayer and makes him subject to all the
taxpayer's rights and liabilities. He is made primarily responsible
to the state for the payment of the tax.24
In comparison, the Pennsylvania statute states that "any person required
17. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (4th ed. 1951).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403- 2 (m) (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-581(b) (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
20. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 372(p) (Supp. 1964).
21. See, e.g., John J. Casale, Inc. v. Pedrick, 72 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
22. Reams v. Vrooman-Fehn Printing Co., 140 F.2d 237, 240 (6th Cir. 1944). See
also Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Joseph, 297 N.Y. 278, 79 N.E.2d 22 (1948).
23. Gibson Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 180 Okla. 53, 68 P.2d 87 (1937), con-
struing Okla. Sess. Laws, 1933, ch. 111, § 3.
24. Id. at 57, 68 P.2d at 89.
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* . . [to collect tax] who shall fail to collect the proper amount of such
tax, shall be liable for the full amount . . .-25 providing for an assessment
26
and, on appeal, reassessment 27 of the vendor's tax liability. Thus, the ulti-
mate responsibility for paying Pennsylvania sales taxes also seems to rest
with the vendor.28 The purpose of the sales tax is to achieve a broad base
by taxing the "consumption" of goods and services, yet, a direct levy by the
state upon individual consumers would be administratively impractical, if not
impossible. Hence, a tax at the time of sale is imposed with direction that
it be added to the selling price, and remitted by the seller. Typical sales tax
laws, including Pennsylvania, expressly prohibit vendors from advertising
or holding out to the public that they will absorb the tax or that it is included
in the basic selling price.2 9 Such a provision has been considered as con-
clusive of intent that the consumer alone should bear the tax burden. 30
A California court,31 however, in construing a similar statute32 stated:
[T] he purpose of this section is to place retailers on an equal basis since it is
deemed unfair competition for the strong to absorb the tax and build up his
trade at the expense of the weaker retailer.33 Such an interpretation, combined
with ultimate liability for the full tax, suggests the possibility that sales taxes
are in reality imposed primarily upon the vendor, and that he is compelled to
require indemnification from his purchasers in furtherance of a policy designed
to equalize impact upon competition. It may also be significant that such taxes
are levied specifically on "sales ' 34 by the seller rather than "purchases" by
the consumer. The effect is much the same as that of an itemized gross
receipts tax.
Reference to the vendor as a tax collector is rare. The minority view
as stated by an Arkansas court is that the merchant is not taxed. He is a
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-546(b) (2) (Supp. 1963). See also MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 380 (Supp. 1964) ; LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 304 (Supp. 1963).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-540 (Supp. 1963).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-542 (Supp. 1963).
28. Although dealers are required to be licensed by the taxing authorities, failure
to acquire a license does not relieve this ultimate liability for the full tax. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-301(a),(b),(d) (Supp. 1963).
29. See Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 77.52 (Supp. 1964) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 382
(Supp. 1964); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 144.080(4) (Supp. 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 3403-573(b) (Supp. 1963) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3019 (1955) ; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 422.49 (1949).
30. See Note, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 242 (1938).
31. Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. DeSalvo, 136 Cal. App.2d 156, 288 P.2d 317
(1955), where the court held that a purchaser under an option is not liable to the seller
for the tax in the absence of an agreement, for there is no absolute requirement upon the
vendor to collect.
32. CAL. REV. & TAx LAWS § 6052 (West 1956).
33. 136 Cal. App. 2d at 162, 288 P.2d at 320.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-201(a) (Supp. 1963). "There is hereby imposed
upon each separate sale at retail ... a tax ...." (Emphasis added.)
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tax collector. The tax is required of the purchaser, and the merchant must
collect and account for it.3 There is, however, no recorded case from any
other state where a merchant has been successfully charged with embezzle-
ment of sales tax funds. Perhaps some of the confusion surrounding the
vendor's status is traceable to characteristically ambiguous and contradictory
language employed by draftsmen of sales tax laws. North Carolina's act
provides a good example:
The tax ...is levied as a license or privilege tax for engaging in
the business of a "wholesale" or "retail" merchant .... Retail mer-
chants may add to the price . . .the amount of the tax . . . [and it]
shall be a debt from the purchaser to the merchant . . .recoverable
at law in the same manner as other debts. It is the purpose and
intent of this article that the tax . . . be passed on to the consumer
instead of being absorbed by the merchantY
6
The determination of the vendor's status, as well as the status of the
tax funds in his possession, has been further influenced by the treatment of
sales tax liability as a debt.a7 South Carolina and Rhode Island statutes08
make reference to such tax as a debt. In addition, Pennsylvania's statute
provides for collection from vendors by an action for debt. a9 It is difficult to
see how a debt can be embezzled. Mr. Justice Holmes, in an opinion holding
a charge of embezzlement improper where an amusement operator failed to
remit federal admissions taxes collected as part of his ticket price, stated:
"[I]t seems to us that under this law the person required to pay over the
tax is a debtor and not a bailee." 40 He accented this distinction by adding:
We see no ground for requiring the ticket office of a theatre to create
a separate fund by laying aside the amount of the tax on each ticket
and to keep it apart, either in a strong box or as a separate deposit
in a bank.
4 1
35. Wiseman v. Phillips, 181 Ark. 63, 84 S.W.2d 91 (1935) (held an early Arkansas
sales tax law unconstitutional). Compare Cook v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 212 Ark. 308,
206 S.W.2d 20 (1947), construing a later "Gross Receipts Tax," ARK. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, §§ 1901-1930 (Supp. 1963). This case tested the existence of any liability to pay
over to the state funds already collected from purchasers, and the vendor was held a
"tax collector" on ground of unjust enrichment.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-165 (Supp. 1963).
37. See Note, 29 CAN. B. REv. 87 (1951), for an interesting discussion of the prob-
lem in Canada. The author considers the status of withheld payroll taxes and notes that
they are trust funds which belong to the Crown from the moment they are deducted;
sales tax collected by a licensed manufacturer or wholesaler, however, may be used in
his business until the end of the month following its receipt; it is a mere liability to
account for a debt.
38. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-18-19 (Supp. 1963).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-548(c) (Supp. 1963).
40. United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1925).
41. Id. at 227.
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Congress followed this decision with a new law declaring such persons
"trustees" of funds so accumulated. 42 While Pennsylvania, unlike the other
states, has incorporated a similar protective device into its sales tax act by
declaring monies collected thereunder to be "a trust fund for the Common-
wealth . . . ,"43 it does not require segregation of tax money except under
certain circumstances at the Department of Revenue's discretion.
44
Assuming the statutory trusteeship to be valid and the vendor's status
as a "tax collector" to be less than clear, a prosecution for embezzlement
might be pursued most appropriately under the Penal Code provision for
embezzlement by trustee .4  No cases appear, however, testing liability under
this provision.
An interesting corollary to the trusteeship question, which likewise has
not been tested in Pennsylvania courts, is the effect upon vendor liability
of loss or destruction of sales tax money without fault. Authority in other
jurisdictions is divided; Florida has decided that the merchant is an involun-
tary trustee and not liable without fault,46 whereas a Georgia court has
sustained the vendor's continuing liability as a taxpayer, fault notwith-"
standing.
47
There are other elements of the Sales Tax Act which suggest that the
vendor is not a tax collector. They include provision for filing "returns,
48
establishment of liens against his assets in cases of non-payment, 49 and a lien
priority over other classes of creditors. 0 There is also a provision for pre-
payment of the tax by the seller with a reimbursement on his own account
where the law or government regulations prevent compliance with a require-
ment to collect the tax on credit sales within thirty days.51
42. 48 Stat. 768 (1934), 26 U.S.C. § 3661 (1946).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-535 (Supp. 1963). A vendor was held to be a
constuctive trustee under a city sales tax law in Philadelphia v. Heinel Motors, 142 Pa.
Super. 493, 16 A.2d 761 (1940). In that case, the court said: "[I]t will be seen that the
defendant's liability to pay the tax is absolute even though the tax is primarily on the
consumer .... Id. at 504, 16 A.2d at 766.
44. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-581(e) (Supp. 1963).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4830 (1963). The statute defines "trustee" as meaning
"trustee on some express trust created by deed, will or instrument in writing ... also
[to] include all executors, guardians and assignees." The statute does not refer specifically
to trustees declared to be such by another statute, and the precise point appears not to
have been adjudicated.
46. See Spencer v. Mero, 52 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1951).
47. See!Williams v. Baer's Den, Inc., 214 Ga. 240, 104 S.E.2d 230 (1958).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-501 (Supp. 1963).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-548(a) (Supp. 1963).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-548(d) (Supp. 1963).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-549 (Supp. 1963), directs that "the taxpayer
shall require the purchaser to pay . . . [the tax] at the time the sale is made, or within
thirty days thereafter .... " (Emphasis added.) Under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-
546.2 (Supp. 1963), one purchasing for resale may prepay the tax to his vendor and limit
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Thus, even though the vendor in Pennsylvania is required to collect the
sales tax, there is substantial evidence to support a conclusion that he is
fundamentally a taxpayer with direction and authority to be indemnified by
his customers in furtherance of sound commercial policy. Yet, the vendor
in Shafer was prosecuted under a statute which previously applied solely to
tax collectors in the more formal sense of the word.
There exists a need for further consideration of the holding in Shafer
in view of Pennsylvania's prior adherence in Commonwealth v. Brown,52
to the doctrine that courts should not permit prosecution under the general
provisions of a penal code where special penal provisions are available. The
court in Brown emphasized the desirability of letting each citizen know what
acts will subject him to a penalty. The court supported its view with a
quotation from Blackstone: "To know with certainty what the laws of our
country have forbidden, and the deplorable consequences to which wilful
disobedience may expose us, is a matter of universal concern. ' 53 The Sales
Tax Act, however, goes beyond the imposition of interest,54 tax additions, 55
and penalties56 for failure to fully comply with its many requirements; specific
penal sanctions are prescribed where vendors file fraudulent returns,5 7 or repre-
sent that they will absorb the tax, refuse to collect and remit the same, refuse
to file returns, refuse to pay the tax or any additions, fail to keep records
and make full disclosure, or issue false exemption certificates. 58
Considered alone, the presence of special criminal provisions in the act
would seem to bring Shafer within the scope of the doctrine prohibiting the
application of general penal law. However, the legislature adopted a saving
clause which stated that nothing in the act should repeal, modify, suspend
or render inoperative any provision of the general laws, and that the criminal
offenses and penalties specified should be in addition to the application of
the general laws arising from any transaction. 59 The extent to which this
clause allows or directs resort to general criminal law is nowhere defined;
his liability to the state to any amount received as tax in excess of the amount prepaid.
In the Shafer case, the court noted that in states where a dealer may prepay his entire
tax liability, and credit receipts against prepaid tax receipts, he is clearly collecting on
his own rather than the state's account. 414 Pa. at 619 n.5, 202 A.2d at 311 n.5. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.05 (1964).
52. 346 Pa. 192, 29 A.2d 793 (1943). Here, a conviction under the general laws was
reversed where the offense involved primary election irregularities and election laws
provided specific penalties.
53. Id. at 197, 29 A.2d at 796.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-570 (Supp. 1963).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-571 (Supp. 1963).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-572 (Supp. 1963).
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-573(a) (Supp. 1963).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-573(b) (Supp. 1963).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-601(b) (Supp. 1963).
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it is therefore subject to interpretation in light of competing policy factors.
Such factors are the need to protect the public revenue, and the universal
concern for predictability of consequences to life and liberty resulting from
proscribed conduct.
The Shafer court interpreted the saving clause as removing the case from
the special penalty doctrine's control. The court further noted that while the
Sales Tax Act made failure to pay over the tax a mere misdemeanor, the
character of the defendant's conduct was more in the nature of a felony.
Absent from the Shafer opinion, however, is any speculation as to why the
legislature which so thoroughly articulated the act's many complex provisions,
criminal and otherwise, failed to make its own distinction in this critical area.
If it had wished to make any violation a felony, it could easily have done so;
or else have incorporated by reference section 823 of the Penal Code. Notably,
it did neither.
A more limited view of the saving clause was taken by a county court
in Commonwealth v. Grace.60 In Grace the court quashed an indictment
brought under section 823 on facts similar to Shafer, stating:
The permissive addition of criminal offenses prescribed by the gen-
eral laws of the Commonwealth ... must be limited to its authorized
scope. It may not be interpreted to extend to indictments under the
general provisions of the Penal Code which are inapplicable, inappro-
priate and improper.6 '
The same court further observed that "the gravamen of the offense . . . is
the violation of . . . [the vendor's] obligation to properly handle and dispose
of monies collected in the operation of his business."
'62
Also an important element in construing these statutes, which the Shafer
court never mentioned, is the chronological interrelationship between laws.
There is reason to question whether in strictly construing section 823 of the
Penal Code, enacted in 1939, a court could conclude with certainty that the
legislative intent was to apply said section to so large a class of persons as
all vendors who are subjected to different responsibilities, by the passage of
a sales tax law sixteen years later. The same policy favoring maximum
protection of life and liberty and calling for a strict construction would seem
to uphold the position that "while remedial laws may extend to new things
not in esse at the time of making the statute, penal laws will not."'63 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court phrased the proposition similarly, stating that
60. 52 Luz. L.R. 286 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (presumably reversed by the instant case).
61. Id. at 288.
62. Ibid.
63. ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES § 333 (1888).
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"it was long ago ruled that a penal act of Parliament cannot be extended
to things that did not exist when the statute was made."
'6 4
Although Pennsylvania had no general sales tax in effect when section
823 of the Penal Code became law in 1939, the legislature was not wholly
unfamiliar with the problem of tax collection by other than public officials.
It had previously enacted65 and reenacted66 a tax on liquid fuels requiring
dealers and distributors respectively to collect the tax. Furthermore, the
act was twice amended 67 to delete reference to the distributor as a taxpayer,
specifying that the consumer was to absorb the levy. The liquid fuels tax
was a tax on a single commodity, collected by a limited class of vendors.
In contrast, the general sales tax applies to nearly all goods and services
marketed for consumption and is administered by the broadest possible class
of merchants and tradesmen. By analogy it might be argued that the problem
of tax collecting vendors did exist and was contemplated in 1939. In view
of the fuels tax history, the question then arises as to why the legislature
failed to clarify both section 823 and the subsequent Sales Tax Act with
respect to vendor status and criminal liability.
The extent to which public policy considerations influenced the Shafer
decision is not certain, but the effect appears substantial. As the fiscal
demands of modern society multiply, so does the strain upon legislative
ingenuity to find broader sources of public revenue and secure its collection.
No small responsibility lies with the courts in protecting this revenue within
the framework of sound jurisprudence and legislative decree. Insofar as
Shafer reflects regard for the importance of sales tax receipts to Pennsyl-
vania's state budget68 and a determination to protect public funds from
wrongful dissipation, the result cannot be criticized; but as a study in strict
statutory construction and retrospective criminal liability, it is not altogether
satisfactory.
Penal laws are to be strictly construed 69 in favor of the accused 70 and
"when a criminal statute calls for construction, it is not the construction
which is supported by greater reason that is to prevail but one which, if
reasonable, operates in favor of life and liberty."'71 Tax laws are also restricted
64. Commonwealth v. Wells, 110 Pa. 463, 1 Atl. 310 (1885).
65. Pa. Laws, 1929, at 1037.
66. Pa. Laws, 1931, at 149.
67. Pa. Laws, 1937, at 2774; Pa. Laws, 1937, at 248.
68. In the Governor's Budget Message for fiscal 1964-65 it was estimated that 45.2%
of all Commonwealth revenue would be collected from the sales and use tax, and that
50.9% of all Commonwealth expenditures would be for public education.
69. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1952).
70. See Commonwealth v. Glover, 397 Pa. 543, 156 A.2d 114 (1960).
71. Id. at 546, 156 A.2d at 116. (Emphasis added.)
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in scope, at least to the extent that their words are not to be extended by
implication. 72 Therefore, to meet these construction requirements, the statutes
in Shafer had to be construed in favor of the defendant. It is submitted that
they were not so construed, for the additional factors of the vendor's status
in relation to the state and the special penal provisions were not considered.
As a landmark in the field of sales tax administration, the Shafer case
has significant implications. The retailer who deals in small items on a cash-
and-carry basis and handles sales tax money by what is characterized as the
"tin cup" method will be little affected; whereas the merchant making credit
sales of items with larger unit prices may be wise to review his accounting
practices. For example, a vendor who treats the sales tax as an accrued
liability payable out of general business funds may be technically guilty of
embezzlement if he defaults in his tax remittance because payments for
merchandise may have reduced his available cash below the amount of the
accrued tax liability. Indictment could similarly result from miscalculation
or failure of anticipated receipts. Even in the absence of specific direction to
segregate sales tax funds, the merchant would be well advised to establish a
special trust account, notwithstanding the inconvenience and added expense.
The need is apparent for prompt and conclusive action by the legislature
to clarify both the scope of section 823 and the status of vendors under the
Sales Tax Act. The business community, which bears an extraordinary and
selective burden of intermediary tax responsibility, deserves protection from
such surprise criminal liability as Shafer represents.
JOHN M. BODDINGTON
72. See Commonwealth v. Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370, 123 A.2d 686
(1956).
